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In an inﬁnite-horizon model with endogenous time preferences, foreign aid,
foreign borrowing, and domestic capital accumulation, a permanent increase
in foreign aid leads to a reduction in long-run capital accumulation, a rise in
domestic consumption, and an increase in foreign borrowing. Short-run anal-
ysis shows that an initial increase in foreign aid leads to a rise in investment,
and a reduction in consumption and external borrowing. On the other hand,
a temporal increase in foreign aid results in an increase in consumption and
foreign borrowing, and a reduction in investment.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The eﬀects of foreign aid and external borrowing on investment and
growth in developing countries have received considerable attention in both
academic studies and policy discussions in the 1990s. Recent studies by
Boone (1994a, 1994b); White and Luttik (1994); Taylor and Williamson
(1994); Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu (1997); World Bank (1997); Obstfeld
(1999); Gong and Zou (2000); and Burnside and Dollar (2000) have reexam-
ined various critical issues related to external ﬁnance and capital inﬂows to
developing countries, which were heatedly debated in the 1960s and 1970s.
In a series of studies by Hollis Chenery and his associates, they have found
that, on the basis of the Harrod-Domar model and realistic parameters on
diﬀerent developing countries, foreign aid and foreign capital inﬂows can
accelerate investment and speed the transition to a targeted self-sustained
growth path; see Chenery and Bruno (1962); Adelman and Chenery (1966);
Chenery and Strout (1966); and Chenery and Eckstein (1970).The critics of
this optimistic view have argued that external resource inﬂows may mainly
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increase consumption, depress domestic savings, and slow down investment
and output growth; see Griﬃn (1970); and Griﬃn and Enos (1970). The
controversy seems to continue mainly on the empirical side. For conﬂicting
empirical ﬁndings on the impact of external ﬁnance on savings, investment
and output growth, see Rahman (1968); Papanek (1972, 1973); Fry (1978,
1980); Levy (1987, 1988a, 1988b); and Giovannini (1983, 1985), among
many others.
More recently, Boone (1994a, 1994b) ﬁnds that foreign aid has hardly any
eﬀect on investment; in particular, foreign aid mainly serves to augment
the consumption of those who are relatively well-oﬀ in developing countries.
Even if foreign aid is tied to speciﬁc sectors and purposes, Feyzioglu et al
(1997) have found that most of foreign aid appears to be fungible, and many
developing countries have diverted foreign aid to public consumption (see
also Pack and Pack, 1990, 1993). These recent empirical ﬁndings naturally
suggest that foreign aid has very little positive impact on capital formation
and output growth in developing countries.
In a recent theoretical paper, Obstfeld (1999) has developed a simple
Cass-Koopmans optimal growth model relating foreign aid to domestic sav-
ings and growth. He ﬁnds that foreign aid has no eﬀect on long-run capital
accumulation, and that it increases long-run consumption dollar for dol-
lar. But in the short run, foreign aid stimulates investment and speeds
up the transition to the long-run steady state of the economy. Taken to-
gether, Obstfeld’s analysis still predicts some positive impact of foreign aid
on investment and short-run output growth.
Our study intends to broaden the Obstfeld model in a few aspects: ﬁrst,
we follow Uzawa (1968); Obstfeld (1981, 1982 , 1990); Lucas and Stokey
(1984); and Becker and Mulligan (1997), and postulate an endogenous time
preference; second, we consider both foreign aid and foreign borrowing in
an inﬁnite horizon model of optimal capital accumulation; third, we follow
Judd (1985, 1987) and quantify the short-run impact of foreign aid on
investment and foreign borrowing. In sharp contrast to Obstfeld (1999),
our main ﬁndings show that a permanent rise in foreign aid reduces long-run
capital accumulation and increases long-run reliance on external borrowing.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the analytical model.
Section 3 studies the long-run properties of the dynamic system and exam-
ines how foreign aid aﬀects steady-state capital accumulation, consump-
tion, and external foreign borrowing. Section 4 looks at the short-run
(including both initial and temporal) eﬀects of foreign aid on investment,
consumption, and external borrowing. Section 5 summarizes the main ﬁnd-
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2. THE MODEL
We consider an inﬁnite-horizon model of foreign aid, foreign borrowing,
and domestic accumulation in an open economy, which is populated by
many identical agents. Each agent has an instantaneous utility function
deﬁned on consumption, u(c(t)), which is increasing, concave, and twice
diﬀerentiable:
uc > 0,ucc < 0. (1)
For the agent’s time preference, ∆t, we follow Uzawa (1968) and Obstfeld
(1981, 1982, 1990)1, and assume that the time preference of the agent is a





where δs is the instantaneous subjective discounted rate at time s and is
deﬁned as
δs = δ[u(c(s))], (3)





(u) > 0, δ(u) − uδ
0
(u) > 0. (4)
The second condition of equation (4) implies that an increase in the
consumption level at a certain future date will increase the discounted rate
for all consumption made forward, while the third condition is given as in
Uzawa (1968), which is used to derive a continuous consumption function;
see the detail in Uzawa (1968). The last condition in equation (4) implies
that the agent prefers consumption with higher instantaneous utility.




Output is produced by a typical neoclassical production function, f(k(t))





(k(t)) < 0. (6)
1See Lucas and Stokey (1984); and Becker and Mulligan (1997) for more justiﬁcation
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Let B(t) be the accumulated foreign borrowing at time t. As for the cost
of foreign borrowing, h(B(t)), we intend to include the constant marginal
cost of foreign borrowing, namely, h(B(t)) = r(t)B(t) with r(t) the interest
rate in the world capital market, as a special case. Along with Bardhan
(1967) and Pitchford (1989), we assume h(B(t)) to be an increasing, convex





(B(t)) > 0, (7)
which implies that the more the agent borrows, the higher the marginal cost
he must pay. All analysis in this paper still holds when h(B(t)) = r(t)B(t).
With the inﬂows of foreign aid, A(t), at time t, the budget constraint for






= f(k(t)) − c(t) − h(B(t)) + A(t). (8)
Denote the net wealth of the agent at time t as W(t), which is deﬁned
by
W(t) = k(t) − B(t). (9)
A simple transformation gives
dW(t)
dt
= f(k(t)) − c(t) − h(B(t)) + A(t). (10)
A representative agent with perfect foresight will choose his consumption
path, c(t), capital accumulation path, k(t), and the foreign borrowing path,





subject to initial conditions k(0) = k0, B(0) = B0, and the budget con-
straints (9) and (10).


















[f(k) − c − h(B) + A], (13)
and constraint (9) and the initial conditions.





f(k) − c − h(B) + A
δ[u(c(t))]
] + µ(k − B − W),
where λ is the costate variable, which represents the imputed marginal util-
ity of wealth. µ is the multiplier associated with the net wealth constraint
(9).














(k) + µ = 0, (16)
dλ
d∆
= λ + µ, (17)
and the transversality condition
lim
∆→∞
λWe−∆ = 0. (18)
To explain equation (14), with substitutions we write it as




[u + λ(f(k) − c − h(B) + A)]uc. (19)
The left-hand side is the marginal utility of consumption, the right-hand
side is the sum of the marginal utility of wealth and the marginal increase
in the present value of the imputed income due to a marginal decrease in
the rate of the time preference. Equation (19) says the these two marginal
values must equal in the equilibrium.
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Equation (20) implies that the marginal cost of foreign borrowing must
equal the marginal productivity of capital at an optimum.










Using condition (11), we rewrite equation (21) as follows
dλ
dt
= λ(δ − f
0
(k)). (22)
3. DYNAMICS AND LONG-RUN ANALYSIS
3.1. Dynamic system
In this section we derive the dynamic system for consumption, c, capital
stock, k, and foreign borrowing, B, with the aid of the ﬁrst-order conditions
given in the last section.
First, from equation (20), we can represent B as a function of k, namely
B = B(k). (23)
















< 0, and h
00
(B) > 0. Equation (25) asserts that an increase in
the capital stock will decrease foreign borrowing.
Notice that with equation (14), we can write λ as a function of B,c, and






0uc(f(k) − c − h(B) + A)
. (26)
Taking total diﬀerentiation in equation (26) and combining it with the













= λ(δ − f
0
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where the coeﬃcients λc, λk, and λB are given in the appendix. In fact,
we are only interested in their values at the steady state.























= λ(δ − f
0
(k)),
with λ determined by equation (26).
From the above equations we derive the dynamic equations for consump-
tion, c, and capital accumulation, k. Here, the dynamic equation for foreign




























where λ,λc, and λB are given in the appendix.
With equations (28), (29), the initial condition k(0) = k0, and the
transversality condition we can determine the optimal consumption path,
c(t), and capital accumulation path, k(t). Finally, from equation (24), and
the initial condition B(0) = B0 we can determine the foreign borrowing
path, B(t).
3.2. The steady state
Obstfeld (1999) has studied the long-run eﬀects of foreign aid in the
traditional Cass-Koopmans optimal growth model. He ﬁnds that foreign
aid generates no long-run eﬀect on domestic capital accumulation, and
that it only increases the consumption level by the same amount. Here, we
reexamine this issue and see how foreign aid can aﬀect not only long-run
consumption, but also long-run domestic capital accumulation and external
borrowing.8 LIUTANG GONG AND HENG-FU ZOU























(f(k∗) − c∗ − h(B(k∗)) + A) = 0. (31)
And equations (30) and (31) are equivalent to















































Equations in (32) characterize the steady-state conditions. The ﬁrst equa-
tion says that output and foreign aid are used to consume and pay for the
cost of foreign borrowing in the equilibrium. The second one shows that
the steady-state marginal productivity of capital equals the consumer’s
time preference.


























































.FOREIGN AID REDUCES DOMESTIC CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 9



















Thus, we know that the steady state is saddle-point stable, i.e., there exists
a unique perfect-foresight path. Along this path, consumption, c(t), the
capital stock, k(t), and foreign borrowing, B(t), converge to the steady
state in the long run.
For the long-run eﬀects of foreign aid on the economy, we have derived
the following results in the appendix.
Proposition 1. A permanent rise in foreign aid reduces long-run cap-













































Bk) < 0, and Bk < 0.
Now, from equation (34) we know that the a permanent rise in foreign
aid decreases the steady-state capital stock. This is because a permanent
increase in foreign aid raises the income level of the agent. The agent then
can aﬀord to increase his consumption and reduce his investment while
maintaining a higher level of long-run consumption, as shown by equation
(35). In the end, foreign aid reduces the long-run accumulation of capital
stock. This is a powerful result. In a modiﬁed Cass-Koopmans model with
an exogenously given time preference rate and without foreign borrowing,
Obstfeld (1999) has found that a rise in foreign aid has no eﬀect on the
long-run accumulation of capital, but it increases the speed of the transition
to the steady state. In this sense, foreign aid still has a stimulating role
for investment and economic growth in developing countries. But from
our analysis, a permanent rise in foreign aid always depresses domestic
investment and output growth in developing countries in both the short run
and long run. Of course, both models have reached the similar conclusion
that foreign aid stimulates consumption.10 LIUTANG GONG AND HENG-FU ZOU
An equally surprising case is equation (36). It implies that a permanent
increase in foreign aid leads to a higher level of foreign debt accumulation.
With a permanent rise in foreign aid and, therefore, permanent income,
the agent’s proportional increase in short-run consumption will be more
than the decrease in savings and investment through external borrowing.
Therefore short-run external ﬁnance will rise. With reduced capital accu-
mulation and lower output in the long run, the long-term level of external
debt will also rise.
Our analysis raises some fundamental doubt about the eﬀectiveness of
foreign aid on economic growth in developing countries. Foreign aid seems
to have no role in breaking “foreign dependency” and establishing “eco-
nomic independence” in many very poor countries. On the contrary, our
analysis predicts that a rising level of foreign aid leads to reduced savings,
lower investment and capital accumulation, and more reliance on foreign
borrowing in the long run. Our theoretical analysis renders strong sup-
port for the negative associations between external ﬁnance and domestic
savings in Griﬃn (1970); Griﬃn and Enos (1970); Fry (1978, 1980); Gio-
vannini (1983, 1985); Taylor and Williamson (1994). Furthermore, our
analysis is also in line with the ﬁnding that there exists no association be-
tween foreign aid and domestic investment and growth by Boone (1994a,
1994b).
4. SHORT-RUN ANALYSIS
In the last section, we discussed the eﬀects of a permanent increase in
foreign aid on the steady-state capital stock, k∗, consumption level, c∗,
and foreign borrowing, B∗. To make the short-run analysis of the eﬀects
of temporal foreign aid, we follow Judd (1982, 1985, 1987).
As in Judd (1982, 1985), suppose the economy is in the steady-state k∗
and c∗ with foreign aid A∗ at time t = 0. And at time t = 0, foreign aid
changes as follows
A = A∗ + z(t), (37)
where  is a parameter; function z(t) represents the intertemporal change
of various parameters. In this paper, the function z(t) can be regarded as a
step function of time. Then a temporary change of foreign aid during time
t ∈ [0,T] can be represented by z(t) = 1,t ∈ [0,T] and z(t) = 0 otherwise.
Substituting equation (37) into the dynamic system of equations (28)



















(f(k) − c − h(B) + A + z(t)). (39)
Again, the linearized system associated with the system of (38) and (39)
has two eigenvalues, one negative and the other positive, which we denote
as µ.

































































































Furthermore, we denote the Laplace transforms by the upper case letters

























00 z(s) + k(0)
λB
λc z(s) + c(0)
!
.(41)
Because the stock of capital (the state variable) cannot jump initially, we
have k(0) = 0. To determine the initial consumption change c(0), we
follow Judd (1985). Please notice that, because the steady state is saddle-
point stable, both C(s) and K(s) are bounded when s = µ (the positive
eigenvalue). But when s = µ, the coeﬃcient matrix of the above linear
equation is singular. By Cramer’s rule, in order to maintain the existence12 LIUTANG GONG AND HENG-FU ZOU
and ﬁniteness for solutions C(s) and K(s) when s = µ, the determinants









































00 z(s) = 0. (43)













Remark 4.1. Because µ is the eigenvalue of the coeﬃcient matrix, we
have (µ − φ11)(µ − φ22) − φ21φ12 = 0. Hence, we can derive the same
conclusion from equation (43).
















Proposition 2. An initial increase in foreign aid will raise the initial
investment rate and decrease the rate of initial foreign borrowing.











00 > 0, (46)
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This is true because an initial increase in foreign aid causes a dollar for
dollar increase in the consumption level. To smooth the consumption path,







With more income available today, the agent will also reduce his rate of
initial foreign borrowing.
Proposition 2 supports the analysis in Obstfeld (1999) in a very limited
sense; that is to say, foreign aid can accelerate short-run investment if it
is perceived as a one-shot rise in income. If foreign aid lasts for a slightly
longer period, its eﬀects on investment and foreign borrowing are just the
opposite of those predicted by proposition 2 as we will see below.
Eﬀects of temporal foreign aid
Suppose foreign aid is temporal, i.e.,

z(t) = 1, t ∈ [0,T];






Proposition 3. A temporal increase in foreign aid will increase the
initial consumption level and foreign borrowing rate. At the same time, it
will decrease the initial investment rate.




















µ + ν = φ11 + φ22,
we have µ − φ22 = φ11 − ν > 0. Hence, we have
dc(0)
dZ(µ)
> 0.14 LIUTANG GONG AND HENG-FU ZOU




















Proposition 3 means that with a temporal increase in foreign aid the
agent will increase his initial consumption level as his income rises. In
addition, rising income provides him with an incentive to lower his current
savings rate and increase his reliance on external ﬁnancing.
Proposition 3 has a close link to Proposition 1 when the time horizon
of foreign aid is suﬃciently large. If the time horizon is inﬁnite, these two
prepositions coincide, and both predict that a permanent rise in foreign aid
reduces capital accumulation and increases external borrowing.
5. SUMMARY
In an inﬁnite-horizon model with endogenous time preferences, foreign
aid, foreign borrowing, and domestic capital accumulation, we ﬁnd that a
permanent increase in foreign aid leads to a reduction in long-run capital
accumulation, a rise in domestic consumption, and an increase in foreign
borrowing. Short-run analysis shows that an initial increase in foreign aid
leads to a rise in investment, and a reduction in consumption and external
borrowing. On the other hand, a temporal increase in foreign aid results
in an increase in consumption and foreign borrowing, and a reduction in
investment.
Our theoretical ﬁndings support many empirical results on the negative
impact of external ﬁnance on domestic savings, investment, and growth. It
also raises some fundamental doubt about the eﬀectiveness of foreign aid








0uc(f(k) − c − h(B) + A)
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0uc(f(k) − c − h(B) + A))2. (A.3)





































These are just the equations in (33) in the text.























Therefore, we obtain the long-run eﬀects of a permanent increase in foreign
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